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1    Introduction 
In many of the developing (transition) countries, government is promoting the use of 
cooperatives as organizations that can help enhance the development of farmers and other 
communities. Agricultural cooperatives are believed to function as a tool for the government in 
promoting the economic and social development, in particular by creating employment, 
generating income, eradicating poverty and strengthen farmers’ (market) power within the 
modern value chain. As for most transitional countries, Chinese government played a primary 
important role in agricultural cooperatives development. The government attempted to 
restructure the agro-food system to a modernized and industrialized one by supporting farmer 
cooperatives and producer organizations. Since the first “Law of Farmer Professional 
Cooperatives” (FPCs) was enacted in 2007, FPCs could enter into complex contracts and the 
development of cooperatives entered a new era. In 2003, there were more than 100 thousand 
producer associations and cooperatives in China (World Bank, 2003). Shen et al (2005) 
estimated that 2.91 percent of the farmers and about 10 percent of villages in China were 
members of FPCs in 2003. In June 2010, the number of FPCs was more than 310 thousands, 
which provided services to about 26 million farm households (covering almost 10 percent of 
farm households)1 . According to the insiders, at least one third of those FPCs only exist on the 
“paper”, another one third does not strongly meet the “cooperatives principles”, and only last 
one third of FPCs are functioning properly2.  
However, agricultural cooperatives may face difficulties if these organizations are established by 
hierarchical structures such as governments (Golovina and Nilsson, 2009a; 2009b). That is, if the 
establishment of cooperatives was initiated by the political leadership and organized by 
government bodies. Previous studies about Russian top–down organized cooperatives by 
Golovina and Nilsson (2009a; 2009b) reveal that the lack of positive socio-psychological 
incentives among Russian agricultural producers to join cooperatives are the main reasons for 
the cooperatives failure in Russia. They noted that these firms are partly financed and 
supported by government, and the management is recommended by public administration. As a 
result, the agricultural producers become members of top–down organized cooperatives 
without having to invest any capital or accepting any other obligations (Franks and Davydova, 
2005).  
In this essay, our aim is to explain the importance of institutional building, creating incentives 
and increasing returns, enhance self–enforcing mechanism and establishing a “learning by doing” 
                                                 
1
 Source: http://www.chinacoop.gov.cn/HTML/2010/09/27/56932.html 
2
 Source:  http://finance.eastmoney.com/news/1355,20101210109873314.html  
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institutional environment among farmers and interest groups by observing the agriculture 
cooperatives development in China. While studies conducted by Golovina and Nilsson (2009a; 
2009b) shows that the main reason of coops’ failures in the transition countries can be 
explained by hierarchical processes in the establishment, it is less clear why the top–down 
process of agriculture cooperatives may face failures which are embedded in their “past”-
hierarchical decision making structure; lack of cooperative governance experiences and 
members “psychological lack of trust in cooperatives”. 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the use of path dependency theory or 
“history matters”-concepts among social scientists as well as institutional economists. The 
concept of path dependence originates from the idea that a small initial advantage or a few 
minor random shocks along the way could alter the course of history (David, 1985).  An obvious 
advantage of such a formal theoretical framework is that it allows to conduct empirical analyses 
and discerning whether the evidence supported or rejected a claim of the extent and scope of 
the sway of past (Page, 2006). Meanwhile, the concept of path dependence may help explain 
why some countries succeed and others do not (Easterly, 2001). In his earlier work, Douglas 
North suggested that country level of success depends on a proper build–up of institutions, 
formal rules and laws. In his later work he had become convinced that “the issue of 
enforcement of property rights is central to credible commitment and a major historical 
stumbling block to realizing the potential gains from trade and that informal norms of behavior 
are critical parts of the way institutions affect performance”.  
In many senses, China’s remarkable economic transformation reflects institutional change 
rather than changes in relative prices and productivity (Krug, 2004). The path and the choices 
that put in this country there likely will have implications for where its agriculture cooperatives 
development is going in the next coming years. Chinese way of gradual and experimental 
reform rather than shock therapy (McMillan and Naughton, 1992), creating reform incentives 
for different players, most importantly for the local cadres and state entrepreneurs (Rozelle and 
Swinnen, 2007), enhancing the self–enforcing mechanism and promoting an environment of 
“learning by doing”.  
Although it is crucial that the impetus to meet and act as a cooperative must come from the 
grass roots needs of farmers and interest actors themselves, the government can contribute by 
creating a supportive institutional environment.  The most important issue is that the farmers 
and other actors must consider themselves to benefit from their memberships in the 
cooperatives. However the created institutional environment should create the incentives of 
farmers and different actors to “learn the cooperatives by collaborating”.  
This paper structured as follows. Background information of cooperatives development in China 
is presented next. An application of theoretical framework follows and theoretical hypothesis 
are formulated. The following section presents methodological issues about data collection 
procedure. Then, the results of the empirical study are presented. The final section presents 
conclusions. 
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2    Why past is important: the agricultural cooperatives development in China 
The economic term of cooperatives is not a completely new concept in China. Its history dates 
back to the early 20th century - before the founding of the communistic republic - when some 
parts of China experienced grass roots organized cooperatives (Du, 2002). At the beginning of 
new China, the central government distributed land to poor and landless farmers by gradually 
confiscated land from landlords and rich farmers. During the early 1950s, various kinds of 
cooperative organizations were established, motivated and facilitated directly by government, 
in order to help farmers who lacked the of tools and skills to produce in an efficient way (Hu et 
al., 2007). In July 1954, the first national congress of China’s cooperatives was established under 
the new name of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives and the so 
called “Cooperative Movement” took place (Guo et al,. 2007). Thereby, the cooperative bodies 
at all levels were established from the top down and promptly lost their “grass roots” character. 
Later agricultural production became collectivized and cooperatives used by government to 
centrally control and manage the production, trade and consumption. The collective farming 
system remained until the arrival of rural economic reforms in the late 1970s. During this more 
than 20-years period, the development of cooperatives in China is characterized as 
“unsuccessful” and collective farming system diminished the productivity due to abuse of the 
management system and whole organizational system was destroyed. These reasons, in 
combination with other reasons (such as political dominance of “left” thinking), were a direct 
obstacle for cooperatives in accomplishing its aims of serving its members. 
Since 1978, China has been restructuring its economy from a planned economy towards a 
market–oriented economy. The earliest reform started from rural area by introducing 
household responsibility system, to return to family–based production from collective farming 
system which households suffered most, and that created the grass roots need and pressure at 
those times. In fact, the decollectivization in China was not a fully top–down political decision 
and the pressure to shift to household based production systems was strong at the grass roots 
levels (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2007). There are three fairly distinct time periods when the new 
rural producers’ organizations emerged in China: the self organizing and self managing era; 
motivating and promoting the coops development periods; and establishing coops law and fast 
development years (Table 1). 
A literature survey of the development of producer organizations after the HRS in China reveals 
three main corresponding causes for above three distinct time periods development. The first 
one is that a major problem in the early of 1980s to 1990s was the breakdown of the 
relationships of the farm with input suppliers and output markets. Farmers make their decisions 
at household level. They face serious constraints in the accessing essential inputs, such as feed, 
fertilizer, seed capital, and selling their products. During this periods, producer organizations 
occurred as associations (xie hui) and mostly providing members with technical supports and 
information. Some regions in China had experienced grass roots producer organization during 
this period. For example, the first grass roots farmers’ organization established in Sichuan 
province which was a small bee farmer organized bee farmers association in Pi County in 1980. 
Second period, from the middle 1990s to 2007, Chinese agriculture faced increasing 
competition in global market and the dramatic change of downstream segments. Producer 
organization started to carry out economic functions. The term “cooperatives” is beginning to 
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dominate and even it has a negative connection in the rural China related to the more than 
twenty years of “collective farming memory” which marked the monopolistic position of 
government owned commercial organizations operating as “cooperatives”. While the term 
“associations” (xie hui) can be formal or informal literally in Chinese concept and covers every 
kind of producer organizations. However, the term “cooperative” (hezuo she) is more restricted. 
Therefore, the western term of agricultural cooperatives formulated as farmer professional 
cooperatives (nongmin zhuanye hezuo she). The main problem during this period was that those 
associations and FPCs have not legal identities and excluded from business contract. Some 
scholars such as Zhou (2004) and Bijman et al (2007) hold a view that Chinese government was 
reluctant to promote cooperatives and other producer organizations during this period and say 
that the development of FPCs in China has not been substantial. Zhou (2004) concluded that the 
reasons are farmers might still have bitter memories from past experiences with cooperatives 
and the collective farming systems and Chinese farmers are experimenting with a wide range of 
collaborative arrangements, which was “learn cooperatives by collaborating” process. The last 
period, after enacting FPCs Law in 2007, FPCs got legal identity and sufficient support both from 
government (top-down) and farmers (grass roots).  
 
Table 1. Basic information of the agricultural cooperatives development in China  
Development periods before and after the 
HRS reforms: 
Main characters: 
(1) 1900-1949 Grass root development 
periods. 
                                                                                    
(2) 1947 – 1957 Still grass root development 
periods, however motivated and facilitated 
by government 
(3) 1958 – 1978 Collective farming periods. 
- Initiated by farmers, members control 
and members benefit 
- Members have control rights, voting 
rights and independent management 
- Members have no control and voting 
rights, state running business 
(1) Self organizing and self managing era - 
beginning of 1980s to the first half of 1990s 
– new rural producers organizations 
emerged from grassroots demand. 
(2) Motivating and promoting the FPCs 
development periods - From the second half 
of 1990s to 2006. 
                                                                                    
(3) Establishing FPCs law and fast 
development years - after 2007, FPCs got 
legal identities and start to involve in 
complex contract. 
- Providing members with technical 
service, technical training, providing 
storage and market information                                      
                                                                                
- Members start to invest and control 
FPCs, have certain degree of voting 
rights, motivated and promoted by 
government. 
- Members have certain degree of 
controlling and voting rights. FPCs 
receive sufficient support from 
government. 
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3    Application of path dependence theory  
A general definition of path dependence is that current and future decisions, actions, or states 
depend on the path of previous decisions, actions, or states (Page, 2006). In this sense, 
individual agents make their decisions and choices on the basis of their “mental models” which 
are formed from their previous experiences. They build their mental model partly through their 
“local” experiences and therefore also vary widely with different environments. In fact, 
individuals agents do learn and changes in mental models originate from outcomes of 
competitions with scarcity. This conception of “learning” path dependence, in which preceding 
a new mental model in a particular environment (competition with scarcity), is well captured by 
the idea of increasing return. There are four related causes of path dependence: increasing 
returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedbacks, and lock-in (Page, 2006). Those four causes are 
related, but conceptually different. Increasing return means that the more a choice or an action 
is taken, the greater is its benefits. In here, the rate of taking an action will reflect the intensity 
of competition among the economic agents. According to North, competition is a ubiquitous 
consequence of scarcity and hence agents in an economy will engage in learning (or taking a 
new action) to survive. Self-reinforcement means that making a choice or taking an action puts 
in a place forces or complementary institutions that encourage that choice to be sustained. It is 
crucial to emphasize the role of institutions in self-reinforcing process. Institutions are the rules 
of the game which are composed of formal rules (law and regulations), informal rules (norms, 
believes and religions), and the enforcement characteristics of both. North states, once in place, 
institutions are hard to change (and competition is the key to institutional change), and they 
have tremendous effect on the possibilities for generating sustained economic growth. 
Individuals and organizations adapt to existing institutions. North observes if the institutional 
matrix creates incentives for piracy, then people will invest in becoming better pirates. Positive 
feedbacks illustrates that an action or choice creates positive externalities when that same 
choice is made by other agents. Positive feedbacks processes can be described as network 
externalities and economies of scope. Finally, lock-in means that one choice or action becomes 
better than any other one because a sufficient number of agents have already accepted that 
choice or action (Page, 2006). 
If we put a logical structure on the possible development of FPCs history after the HRS reforms 
in China, path dependence theory gives a primary general framework to better understand 
those above mentioned history dependence. In the late of 1970s, Chinese government had 
introduced HRS to rural agricultural production. This basic “rule of the game”, individual 
decision – making of family farmers, had pushed up the agriculture productivity by stimulating 
farmers’ incentives. However the breakdown of the relationships in the farm with input 
suppliers and output markets brought some farmers into a group to share the information 
among group in a low cost. This kind of small and random action or decision initiated by those 
active agents, who are active enough to survive in a given environment, had a significant impact 
on realizing first step “increasing returns”.   Facing the pressure from down stream and global 
market in the middle of 1990s, Chinese farmers realized simply sharing the information in a 
farm association was not sufficient for them to survive. Therefore the second new action or 
choice was needed in order to survive. Given the early market condition in China, only the 
government could help farmers to organize themselves to play with “dragon head” down 
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streams3. As Williamson (2000) stated institutional transformation goes beyond the rule of the 
game to include the play of the game (contract). In order to allow the FPCs enter into contract 
and formal business, complementary institutions should be established which could encourage 
the “initial” action or choice to be sustained. As a consequence, the FPCs Law was enacted in 
2007. 
In order to better investigate the development of FPCs, we developed Figure 1 (inspired by 
Figure 1 in Sydow et al (2009, pp 692) who modeled the Constitution of an Organizational Path). 
Following Sydow et al., we subdivided the whole process of evolving path dependence into 
three stages governed by four different “path dependence” causes.  
Phase I – the “Open Option”-phase - is characterized by a situation in which all agents have the 
same opportunities. We assume that there are two different main groups of agents (where 
agents are farmers in our case): “ordinary agents” and “active agents”. The main difference 
between these two agent types is that active agents are “active” in the terms of taking new 
action or choice in a given environment (this study mainly focus on active agents). Once a 
decision or choice is made by active agents, this choice may create the increasing returns. This 
moment would be entering into the dynamics when the increasing returns process start to 
create “critical juncture”, and it indicates the end of the Phase I. In here, the process or 
direction of critical juncture might be grass roots, top-down, or both ways.   
In phase II – the “Learning by Doing”-phase – a new regime takes the lead which is building 
proper institutional environment for self-reinforcing processes. A dominant action pattern is 
likely to emerge, where active agents convert themselves from “active” to “learning” and from 
“learning” to “mature” agents which mainly derived by positive feedbacks or network 
externalities, which the renders of the whole process more and more irreversible. Once in place, 
institutions are hard to change, the range of option narrows and it becomes progressively 
difficult to reverse the initial action or choice – this creates the evolving of path processes. 
In the last stage – phase III or the “Lock-in”-phase – further consolidation takes place, which 
eventually leads to a lock-in. The dominant decision pattern becomes unchanged and gains a 
deterministic character. When one particular action or choice has become the predominant 
mode and the flexibility has been lost. Therefore, once in the locked-in phase, the system may 
have created a potential new “inefficient” path, because it loses its capability to adopt better 
alternatives (Sydow et al, 2009).  
  
                                                 
3
 Agricultural processors are called dragon head firms in China because they are considered the key to leading small 
farmers on the road to prosperity in the 1990s. Here “dragon head” down streams include both processing firms 
and supermarkets. 
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 Ordinary agent            Active agent                       Learning agent   
   Mature agent         Emerging path                   Range of available options 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model for Analyzing Top-down Cooperatives Development by Applying Path 
Dependence Theory (inspired by Figure1 in Sydow et al (pp 692). 
 
Based on the discussion above, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H1: Increasing returns and “critical juncture” can occur when agents or members of 
cooperatives can change their “characters”   
H2: Members of FPCs get a better view on cooperatives as they get knowledge or experiences 
“leaning by doing” 
 
4    Methodology and data description 
To test the hypothesis formulated in this paper, a survey covering 41 agricultural cooperatives 
and 36 village communities was conducted during July to September 2009 in the Zhejiang and 
Sichuan provinces in China. There are three level of cooperatives exist in China according to its 
operating size, importance in local development, service capability, product quality, and good 
democratic governance which was standardized and authorized by local governments: 
provincial level demonstration cooperatives (shengji shifan hezuoshe); county level 
demonstration cooperatives (shiji shifan hezuoshe); and ordinary cooperatives. We have 
controlled the balance in those three levels cooperatives among 41 interviewed cooperatives. 
To approach the objective of this study, two different questionnaires were developed for 
directors of coops and village headman respectively (which both are assumed to represent 
“active agents”), their main roles and their incentives of establishing or motivating coops. All of 
surveyed coops are “service” oriented and specialized in vegetable, horticulture (including fruit) 
and livestock (including aquatic products) productions. The survey showed that, in general, 
most of the coops are small and local, and in an early development stage. Table 2 indicates that 
the decision regarding to members join or leave FPCs is mainly decided by the board of directors. 
More than half of the FPCs’ applies a closed membership policy.   
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Table 2. Summary statistics of FPCs in Zhejiang and Sichuan province (in 2008) 
 Number   Share (%)   
Who make the decision regarding to 
members join to FPCs or leave the coops 
(N=41) 
    
members congress 5 12.2   
board of directors 36 87.8   
coops director 0 0   
     
Coops membership policy (N=41)     
Open 18 43.9   
Closed 23 56.1   
     
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
Year of established of FPCs (N=41) 2005.7     1.8       2001 2008.6 
Total number of original FPCs members 
(N=41)  
167.3 420.1 5 2500 
Total number of current FPCs members 
(N=41) 
437.1 668.4 25 3500 
The number of meetings hold by all FPCs 
members (N=41) 
3.5     2.9           1 16 
The number of meetings hold by FPCs 
directors of board members (N=41) 
10.8     13.2           1 50 
The number of meetings hold by FPCs 
supervisor board members (N=40) 
10.5     13.6           1 50 
 
Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics of the 36 surveyed villages. It can be noted that each 
village has on average 1.8 coops and 2 various farm organizations except coops. It is clear that 
there are no agricultural enterprises or firms in village level among those villages. Meanwhile, 
most of the farmers are low educated and still mainly occupied in agricultural sector.  
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Table 3. Summary statistics of surveyed villages in Zhejiang and Sichuan province (in 2008) 
General Average Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
Number of households in the village (N=36) 624.9     375.2          45 1478 
Total population (N=36) 2163.8     1191.3         240 4689 
Average income 2008 (N=36) 6703.1     2557.2        2000 12000 
Number of various farm organizations (N=36) 2.0     3.9           0 17 
Number of farm cooperatives (N=36) 1.8     1.2           1 5 
Coops member farmers in the village, % (N=35) 31.9     23.9           1 80 
Agriculture farmers in the village,  %(N=36) 53.1     21.4          20 90 
     
 Number   Share   
Average education level (N=36)     
Illiteracy 0 0   
Primary school 11 30.6   
Junior high school 25 69.4   
High school, vocational technical schools 0 0   
College and above 0 0   
     
Main agriculture products*      
Fruit 22 -   
Horticulture 4 -   
Livestock 7 -   
Vegetable 17 -   
Aquatic products 2 -   
Others 7 -   
* Sums to more than 36 since some villages has several main products 
 
In order to test the hypothesis, the surveyed coop directors and village headmen (community 
leaders) were asked a number of questions related to their past and current positions, their 
roles in within the coops development, and their views on which types of “agents” that most 
easily establish coops. Knowledge, which is located and embedded in individual agent, is 
important to analyzing the divergence of interests in a given environment. The divergence of 
interests between different agents is problematic from a “path dependence” knowledge 
perspective. Hendrikse et al. (2004) has described the path dependence characters of 
knowledge as tacit knowledge, which is personal, implicit, and hard to codify and to express in 
the formality of language.  They also indicated that it is costly to transfer to outside groups and 
usually resides with limited number of individuals. Therefore, at the early stage, it is less costly 
to transfer the knowledge by changing “active” agent’s character or state (occupation in here) 
rather than transfer the knowledge from agent to agent. The frequency of meeting between 
board directors and members of cooperatives is a main indicator for cooperatives development, 
also a main distinguished character of cooperatives forms from other types of business. 
Communication is an essential activity in cooperatives, because members are the owners of the 
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cooperative, meanwhile members’ interests are more and more diverse (Hendrikse et al., 2004). 
Most importantly, communication itself is a learning process.  
 
5    Results 
Table 4 shows that more than 60 percent of the directors of coops former positions were village 
cadre and rural agriculture technical staff. Few off-farm employees and private business owners 
have became directors of coops. However, among the 41 surveyed directors, 7 were previously 
specialized farmers and 7 were running small businesses (part time farmers). Most of those 
directors are the first generation of coops directors which indicate they are the initiators or 
original opinion leaders of coops establishment.  
 
Table 4. Summary statistics: interviewed coop directors 
 Number   Share (%)   
Former occupation (N=41)       
Off-farm employee 1 2.4      
Doing small businesses 7 17.1   
Do business (or running private company) 0      
Farmer 7 17.1        
Village cadre 13 31.7        
Others (mainly rural agricultural technical 
staff) 
13 31.7   
     
Current co-occupation (N=41)     
Off-farm employee 0 0   
Doing small business 0 0   
Do business (or running private company) 1 2.4   
Farmer  26 63.4   
Village cadre 7 17.1   
Others (mainly rural agricultural technical 
staff) 
7 17.1       
     
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
The number of holding shares in coops 
(N=40) 
20.2     19.1           0 80 
 
Among those directors, more than 63 percent of them are the agriculture farmers at the same 
time who are involved and specialized in either production or marketing. Almost the entire 
directors whose former occupations are off-farm employee and small business runners became 
full time “specialized” farmers. Relatively less change happened among the directors whose 
original positions are village cadres and rural agricultural technical staff. More than half of those 
directors still maintained their former positions in public or government administrating sectors. 
Meanwhile, they are the main shareholders within the coops.  
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A similar investigation was conducted at village leader’s level. Table 5 shows that the 
possibilities to become a village leader and do not seem to be strongly connected with former 
background. However, the possibility seems to increase if for former village cadres and for those 
still involved agriculture. Among the 36 village headmen, more than 60 percent of had 
participated in coops which correspond to 22 village headmen. Among those 22 village leaders, 
13 are the core members and 12 are holding shares within the coops.  
 
Table 5. Summary statistics: village leader 
 Number   Share (%)   
Former main occupation (N=36)     
Off-farm employee 3 8.3   
Doing small businesses 8 22.2   
Do business (or running private company) 0 0   
Farmer 11 30.6   
Village cadre 13 36.1   
Others 1 2.8   
     
Member status (N=36)     
Vice president of coop (core member) 1 2.8   
Member of director (core member) 6 16.7   
Director of supervisor (core member) 3 8.3   
Vice director of supervisor (core member) 1 2.8   
Supervisor (core member) 2 5.6   
Ordinary member 7 19.4   
Others 2 5.6   
     
 Yes 
Number 
(Share, %) 
No 
Number 
(Share, %) 
  
Is your current main occupation a village 
headman? (N=) 
36 (100) 0 (0)   
Did you join coops? (N=36) 22 (61.1) 14 (38.9)   
Whether holding shares? (N=22) 12 (54.5) 10 (45.5)   
     
 Average Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
The number of holding shares in coops 
(N=12) 
105.6     287.2           1 1,000 
Amount per share (Yuan) ( N=12) 18145.9 57335.1           1 200,000 
Holding share ratio in total coops share, % 
(N=5) 
12.2     8.8          0.8 20 
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The relationship between local community leaders and coops are investigated next. Figure 2 
reveals that the community leaders believe they have the main roles for leadership, 
intermediary work, supervision and organization within the coops development. During the 
discussions with the village leaders, one interesting phenomenon was that some regions 
received “political” indicators from the “top” administration which required the number of 
coops should be newly established and the number of farmers should be covered within the 
coops. This became of the main indicator for village leaders or local public administrators to 
show their career “capability”. To a certain degree, this kind of “political” needs also created 
and facilitated the “learning” process from other region or other coops experiences among the 
public administrating and local community leaders.  
 
 
* Sums to more than 36 since some villages’ leaders have several main roles. 
Figure 2. Village communities’ main role in FPCs development 
 
It is not clear if the current view or expectation influences the future trend of development. The 
data in Figure 3 shows that both coops directors and village leaders believe professional large 
farmers are the main engines in creating or organizing coops. However, they have different 
views regarding the second, third and forth order “engines”. Coops directors experienced that 
agricultural entrepreneurs are the main organizers in the second and third order, followed by 
local village leaders. On the contrary, village leaders put themselves in the second most 
important position, followed by agricultural entrepreneurs and local agricultural technical staff 
as the first four important potential organizers in the respect of establishing coops. 
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Figure 3. Groups of people that most easily organize coops according to FPCs directors and village 
leaders. 
 
The survey results show that all PFCs members annually organize more than 3 meetings.  Board 
of directors and supervisors had holed more than 10 meetings in 2008 (Table 2). Over all, the 
frequency of meetings is not low. Figure 4 shows that the coops’ future development issue is 
number one discussed topic in both all FPCs members meetings and board directors meetings. It 
is not difficult to understand the technical training and production management issue evince a 
second and third most discussed subjects in all FPCs members meetings, because coops are 
providing most of the technical services and production management issue is one of the biggest 
challenges for ordinary members. According to the data, board of supervisors undertakes the 
task of supervising annual residual distributions and participating coops’ future development 
discussions. In here, it is necessary to mention that the issue of “going out and learning from 
neighbor region cooperative development experiences” is included within the topic of coops’ 
future development and significant number of cooperatives have discussed this issue and 
applied in their development practice.       
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Figure 4. The numbers of meetings hold in different topics by different groups of FPCs members. 
 
6    Conclusions  
The aim of the study is to explain the importance of institutional building, creating incentives 
and increasing returns, enhancing self–enforcing mechanism and establishing a “learning by 
doing” institutional environment among farmers and interest groups by observing the 
agriculture cooperatives development in China. The findings indicate in certain degree that 
China has succeeded in PFCs development in the respects of institutional buildings and creating 
incentives among different agents. In general, village cadres and local agricultural technicians 
are the most important initiators and organizers of FPCs. Local businessmen and specialized 
professional farmers showed up as the second important players in PFCs development in 
Zhejiang and Sichuan provinces in China. These findings provide arguments for the rejection of 
Chinese agricultural cooperatives are purely organized from top-down processes. However, 
these findings also confirmed that Chinese governments are still the essential initiators and 
motivators of FPCs establishment and development. 
 
A major reason is that Chinese FPCs development is still at its early stage of development, which 
is defined as “leaning by doing” or “learning cooperatives by collaborating” stage. At this stage, 
the local experienced cadres and technically skilled bureaucratic officials are allowed to join the 
business community and FPCs development without having to quit their government positions. 
These “bureaucratic” agents had a positive impact on China’s FPCs development and less costly 
to organize small farmers, as it stimulated interest of those cadres in the local economic growth 
and new FPCs development.   
 
Both formal and informal institutions are fundamental to the success of cooperatives. However, 
building self-enforcing mechanism within this new type of organization is the heart of success. 
To some extent, it is related to the cooperative’s existence and members should benefit from 
joining cooperatives. More seriously, however, it is crucial whether the agricultural producers in 
the long – run future will establish agricultural cooperatives on their own initiates as their 
The number of meetings hold in different topics by different groups of 
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experiences from “learning by doing”.  During this self-enforcing mechanism building processes, 
communication is an essential activity and it facilitates the knowledge transfer, build trust 
among members, readiness to collective actions, flourish relationships, and bring the members’ 
attitude towards solidarity, equity, and democracy. 
 
 Pursuing the objectives of building grass roots cooperatives, one element of this transformation 
(self-enforcement mechanism building) is that the government should step back from active 
involvement and control over FPCs economic activities and confines itself to a role of regulating 
and supervising the operation of markets. However, path dependency “habits”, which has been 
developed through years of active initiators and motivators in the local economic activities, will 
not disappear easily. It needs those non - “bureaucratic” agents to be mature enough to take an 
active position and to initiate “increasing returns” in the FPCs development and to realize 
“positive feedbacks” in the long – run future.      
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